Introduction
Old receivers impede spectrum efficiency when they are not compatible with transmission patterns of new receivers. Spectrum reallocation policy requires speedier rates of exit by outdated receivers. The challenge, however, is a sequential one, as old Users are stuck with old technically inefficient equipment [in the land mobile radio band]. Why? Because none of them has the incentive to adopt new equipment on their own that would free up spectrum for use by others. Instead, they came to the FCC with a proposal to transition over twenty-seven years to equipment that was not quite state of the art at the time of their proposal. efficiency. 11 How to pay for configuration between old receivers and new receivers is a critical question for spectrum reallocation. 12 Challenges arise from the asymmetries and symmetries of receiver boundaries.
I. Boundaries: Asymmetries & Symmetries
Receiver design is sequential, where new radios are deployed into sensitive electromagnetic landscapes. New transmitters create new ripples in intended frequencies and extended out-of-band frequencies. Old receivers experience distortions in expected signal patterns which alter the operator's optimization matrix.
A. Asymmetries in Receivers
Physics and time generate asymmetries as receivers listen for signals.
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Equilibrium is disturbed when signal patterns change to a significant degree. If a new transmitter threatens an old receiver's ability to hear signals, a technical conflict arises.
How much interference rises to the level of a claim of appropriate intrusion is a determination that depends on the sensitivity of neighboring devices. 14 An objective 11 de Vries, Radio Regulation Summit, at 19 (" [T] here was general agreement among the participants that the quality of receiver front ends was declining. It is expensive to build a receiver with a narrow, linear, tunable front end that can reject out-of-band interference."); Weiser & Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Debate Part I, at 557 n.38 (quoting Marguerite Reardon, CNET, "The real culprits [for interference] are the speaker, car stereo, PC and other consumer electronics manufacturers for not designing their products to fend out this interference."). 12 Weiser & Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Debate I, at 607 (describing the need for equipment upgrades, suggesting "the FCC consider requiring the entrant to subsidize such upgrades"). 13 de Vries, Radio Regulation Summit, at 19: While co-channel property rights are easy to manage, inter-channel rights are more tricky because radio system designs make a huge number of assumptions about the interference that will be generated by neighbors; when these assumptions fail to hold, difficulties ensue. Inter-channel interference issues also tend to emerge over time, as services are deployed, often with characteristics different from those that were envisaged at the outset. 14 
B. Symmetries in Receivers
Viewed as a resource allocation game, however, a theoretical equilibrium of private and social costs exists across economic boundaries of spectrum users. Professor
Ronald Coase articulated the interchange of private and social costs when transaction costs are zero, 24 correcting the Pigouvian view that externalities were separate from private costs of the parties at issue. 25 This framework of private and social externalities became the foundation of law and economics scholarship for the study of default rules 20 Weiser & Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Debate Part I, at 583-87 (describing predictive models of simple and complex form, based on wave theory and terrestrial environments). 21 
Thomas, Finding Interferers:
You may be receiving only multipath in an urban canyon…You go to the corner so you can look in all directions… Figure out the strongest direction. Then keep going, walk down the block to find the next block. Don't waste your time looking mid-block, until you get a dramatic change in direction. This means you're getting close. Then you continue to follow… They walked around the building and found the signal emanated. Took a few more weeks because upper floors of the building were locked without public access, but got solved eventually. [Spectrum] use is governed by a set of rules and narrow restrictions, designed to limit interference, whose origins go back nearly a century….There is widespread agreement that the current institutional arrangements are a source of major inefficiency and waste, and that the public interest calls urgently for some substantial modifications."). disputes over the shifts of railroad sparks to farm fields, odorless communities to pig farms, doctor's offices to candy factories, and cattle ranching to corn fields.
27
Professor Coase evaluated the Federal Communications Commission's approach to social and private costs in spectrum resources as well. 28 Economic fundamentals apply to the uses of the radio spectrum, although much asymmetry still characterizes spectrum boundaries currently in the form of "lumpy" entitlements. 29 Across the range of radio hardware designs and industry applications, furthermore, the marginal costs and marginal benefits of delineating precise or broad use rights vary today.
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At a time of a spectrum crunch, however, the need arises to upgrade receivers from old to new. 31 The knowledge problem of which receivers should change transmission patterns, and when, depends on decentralized market information. Spectrum value is the present value of a stream of future profits… As with any capital investment, the net return of investing in a band of spectrum will be realized over time. The upfront capital investment is expected to result in a stream of net returns (revenue, minus cost), over the lifetime of the asset. The value of the investment and expected stream of profits depends critically on the timing of this stream of returns. The present value of any future payment is equal to the amount you would need to invest today to receive that future return.. The prices observed from the auction of licenses for comparable spectrum are one indicator [of value], but are imprecise due to differences in the technical characteristics, rules, interference environment and temporal variations in the supply and demand of the spectrum being compared.
Orderly change to the population of receivers on the field can happen through a variety of forms of rights delineation, such as flexible private ownership, regulatory settlement, trespass and nuisance remedies, compensatory damages, and zoning decrees.
Operators must adjust the configuration of receivers at an additional design cost that reduces waste. 36 The value of reconfiguring a radio in a particular manner is inseparable from the operator's incentives within a strategic revenue model as well.
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Engineering new receivers is an iterative process, even for next generation radios that employ signal back-off and advanced information capacity channels. Designers rely on their knowledge of current emissions patterns when building next generation receivers to specification. 38 A new negotiation of incomplete borders happens when new emissions come into play. 39 For example, if an old receiver faced no threat from any high powered neighbors at the deployment stage, it had no need to build filters to create a 36 See, e.g., Stephen Lawson, IDG News, GPS Group Slams Lightsquared's New Plan, PCWorld, July 5, 2011, http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/235095/gps_group_slams_lightsquareds_new_plan.html (describing opposing views on the cost of installing filters into GPS units. Lightsquared has argued that GPS devices were made with inadequate filters causing interference. The article states that Coalition to Save Our GPS argued that "Retrofitting existing GPS receivers so they could work after LightSquared's launch would take at least 15 years, because devices such as in-car navigation systems are replaced on long cycles. LightSquared said there are already suitable filters for cell phones that cost about five cents each." ). 37 Id. (the Coalition to Save Our GPS argues that Lightsquared offers competing GPS-related services which acts as a competitive threat). 38 See Nate Anderson, GPS Industry Rages: Lightsquared 4G Network Would "Defy" Laws of Physics, ArsTechnica, June 2011, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/06/how-gps-interference-couldderail-a-new-national-4g-networkgps-industry-rages-lightsquared-4g-network-would-defy-laws-ofphysics.ars (LightSquared says "interference is caused by the GPS device manufacturer's decision over the last eight years to design products that depend on using spectrum assigned to other FCC licensees."). 39 Id. (where Lightsquared offered a three-part solution to upgrade 200,000 GPS devices, including 300 million GPS-enabled cell phones, compared to Coalition to Save Our GPS position that Lightsquared should "move out of the MSS band altogether" for "such widespread harmful interference" to "a national utility").
separation at the time. 40 Preempting imagined wave borders is too costly to predict and build in competitive markets.
Due to the wild card of reconfiguration cost, receivers need to be protected from interference changes. Whether a foe can be turned into a friend, or a 4% expected present value of a certain type of interference incorporated into the cost of doing business, 41 depends on the economic status of two neighbors as complements or substitutes. A new receiver can be a complementary addition or a substitutionary rival to an old receiver's design scheme. How devices align engineering goals and configuration costs to minimize interference margins is a matter of economic incentives.
II. Complement and Substitute Emissions
The relationship between an old receiver and new receiver defines what combined uses will be innovated, to what degree, and how configuration cost payments will flow.
42
A new device can be seen as a harmless addition to the frequency space, or a significant source of signal interference. The technical shapes of potential new borders embody thousands of permutations, and which of those will be realistic combinations depends on the ability of an operator to profit from such choices.
43 40 Id. (where Lightsquared's plans for 40,000 ground stations would transmit at higher power, close proximity compared to GPS signal reception capabilities). 41 Recall the Weiser & Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Debate Part III, at 1027 with the example of radio interference predicted in probabilistic behaviors. Whether a 20% chance of interference at 20% time gives 4% expected present value of a presumption of interference, rises to random or trivial degree may differ on the sensitivity and quality of service required by the operators. 
A. Complement-Substitute Governance
Who decides the appropriate mix of complement and substitute uses? 44 A particular signal emission can be considered a complement in one situation or time, while a substitute in another. 45 The definition and boundaries of complementarity will determine whether a marginal change in electromagnetic activity is disruptive or trivial.
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A legal framework for who decides the character of such design changes can be articulated in the exclusion and governance model. Governance rules set by a public agent or standards coalition require higher precision, imposed on multiple independent parties. 48 Whether a radio signal is determined as friendly or invasive depends on rules set for a particular frequency band. 44 Smith, Self-Help, at 79 ("For example, Blackacre may be suited to having multiple people cultivating crops or might be subjected to multiple uses as long as the two uses are constrained from conflicting too much… I call these use-oriented rules examples of a governance strategy, as opposed to the basic exclusion strategy."). 45 For the flexibility of a cognitive node to receive or avoid signals, see Andrea Goldsmith, Syed Ali Jafary, Ivana Maric & Sudhir Srinivasa, Breaking Spectrum Gridlock with Cognitive Radios: An Information Theoretic Perspective (describing "side information [that] typically comprises knowledge about the activity, channels, codebooks and/or messages of other nodes with which the cognitive node shares the spectrum."). Much research in cognitive radio protocols define etiquette rules for backoff: Carlo Boano, et al. 52 Baumol & Robyn, Evolutionary Regime, at 19 n.3 (describing the private exchange between the owner of a private pond for fish stock with fish suppliers to monitor, fence, and contract to reach mutually beneficial levels of fish populations over time). Smith, Self-Help, at 79:
[C]onsider the owner as a chooser among the possible uses of Blackacre. As already discussed, the right to exclude makes no reference to these uses, but, by installing the owner as a gatekeeper over the asset, the owner's interest in these uses is protected. The degree of delegation can be measured by the size of the "mismatch" between the right (to exclude) and the privileges of use that it indirectly protects…. Conversely, if the law makes detailed reference to uses and seeks to solve use conflicts between the owner and various neighbors or even been the owner and strangers, then the delegation is a lesser one; the law has removed from the owner some of the choice over uses and the choice over modifications of legal relations pertaining to those uses. A property right excludes (in the limit) the whole rest of the world from the use of the property except on the owner's terms. A contract right excludes only the other party to the contract. Freedom to make and enforce contracts but not to create legally enforceable property rights would not optimize resource use… See also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773-852 (2001) (where the common law has dealt with information cost discrepancies in bailments, landlord-tenant law, security interests, and trusts depending on the nature of in personam relations, in rem relations and third-party information costs to default to particular obligations and remedies).
uncertain" equation that reflects market conditions. 59 The degree by which a spectrum user could waste, or, in a competitive market, productively divide, a delineated entitlement ranges widely. 60 Business models are subject to uncertain returns on investment which require strategy to reduce other forms of downside risk. That right is analogous to a building owner's right to occupy the entirety or to choose instead to lease space out in any proportion-a floor, a room, a rooftop sign-and for any length of time-10 years, a month, or an hour. Complete rights to spectrum would similarly allow a licensee to occupy, subdivide, and sublease at will. 61 An exclusive right of use determination has more focus and determinacy than a right to exclude. Exclusive use determination describes property as an interest. The bearer of such an interest enjoys a domain of negative liberty, but the domain is structured to encourage owners to deploy ownable assets to most of the productive uses for which property is typically used. By contrast, a right to exclude from the thing merely states a particular outcome. It abstracts away from the general context and principles that explain why the outcome is justified. the interference margin can be a function of the economic interests of neighboring emissions areas. 65 An absolute right to complement-substitute determination in radio emissions would require far broader license and merger terms than available in the United States today, but international jurisdictions provide models of flexibility.
See generally
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C. Substitute-Substitute Rivalry
Despite engineering possibilities, operators often appear before the FCC in a substitute-substitute posture of rival legal footing. 67 To the regulator, the preferred use of the spectrum is unknown, and principles are needed to minimize social waste while defining legal protections for resource investments of existing users. Especially in intraservice interference conflicts, we see that disputes over spectrum can be more like disputes over possessory rights than like pollution rights. The values placed on the spectrum by the victim and the interferer tend to be correlated because both parties are using the same kind of architecture with the same kind of spectral efficiency. Although the two operators might place different values on the spectrum they use, just as Sally and Jane might value Jane's car differently, it is the utility of the spectrum for the same kind of use that they value. nuisance laws in property, and negligence and strict liability in torts, each embody norms of deference to property owners of known and unknown conflicts of short and long duration of productive or disruptive purpose. 70 Intellectual property rules build on this history to promote the discovery, cultivation and improvement of information goods by competing firms that generate economic activity today.
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Judges have refined default rules to enjoin or compensate parties to promote productivity in light of information costs and transaction costs. 72 The costs and benefits of ex post or ex ante delineations of rights depend on policy priorities, 73 views on the 69 Compare Sahai, Spectrum Zoning, whose model presupposes liberal rights "whether an ISP will buy out a TV station's primary rights." Id. The runtime model also presupposes integration of private costs between two independent radio operators:
When the margin is small… all shared channels in which the TV primary is operating are essentially given entirely to TV, while ISP recovers no utility in these channels. When … allocated at runtime to ISP, it achieves the same utility it would in an exclusive channel if the overhead is 0. 70 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, at 69 ("The law of trespass, by refusing to consider the value of the invader's activity, channels the transaction into the market, where it belongs. The law of nuisance, by permitting a comparison of the value of the conflicting activities, simulates the result of a market transaction, which is infeasible."). structure of the wireless industry, and institutional capabilities to adjudicate efficient outcomes. 74 Information costs influence efficient outcomes, but do not preclude valuemaximizing transactions. 75 In spectrum, the valuation of the use of an old receiver against a new receiver is an information cost, where spectrum traffic cannot easily be compared. 76 The comparative difficulty lies in the value of a possessory right compared to a usage right. 77 Compare for instance the use value of a car that drives once a week to the movies, compared to the same vehicle that drives daily to place of employment. Both users might pay $6,000 for the possessory right, while extracting divergent values of productivity.
78 74 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1996) , cited in Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 69 n.3 (The common law approach depends on a judge, jury, and fact finding, taking into account the context of business scale, the nature of the technology, the information needed by the adjudicator, and the speed by which resolution is needed). 75 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, at 71 (describing the value-maximizing transaction between a homeowner and factory, with the costs of installation of a filter):
If to avoid this overpayment the factory offers only the filter, then it will forgo sales to the others even though, but for this asymmetric information (each homeowner knows how much pollution harm he is suffering, but the factory does not), these sales would be value-maximizing transactions. There is no single price that will not prevent some value-maximizing transactions from taking place. 76 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, at 69:
Information is costly to acquire, and less information is required to determine whether the plaintiff's use is more valuable than the defendant's than to determine the value of the plaintiff's use (or the reduction in that value caused by the defendant), just as it is easier to determine whether one person is taller or heavier than another than it is to determine how tall and heavy each person is. 77 The comparative value of "free" over-the-air broadcast television and the economic benefits of Radio technologies depend on physical infrastructure to shorten the distance from a wireless device to wired networks as well. 79 The problem of artificial scarcity of spectrum licenses released by government auction distorts valuation metrics also. 80 Even with limited prospective data, analysts and firms differ on projections for spectrum auction results, when auctions vary in the license terms offered.
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Transaction costs also impact efficient rules, depending on whether bargains must be made between many parties, or whether bilateral monopoly or repeat player situations exist. 82 In real property, nuisance law provides a model for high-transaction cost [T] he value that two contending parties place on a possessory right tends to be more highly correlated, and thus more easily known, than the value that two contending parties place on a usage right. Suppose, for example, that Sally has taken Jane's car. Sally and Jane both value the utility of the car, even though they might value it to different degrees. By contrast, in the case of a conflict over air pollution, the polluter values the entitlement to pollute as a means to enhance the value of an enterprise, while those adversely affected by pollution value the absence of pollution.
There is likely to be far less correlation between the two valuations of the air than the two valuations of the car. As a result, Sally and Jane will have better information, as compared to a court, than will the factory and homeowner. 79 Id.
80 Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan, Chapter 5: Spectrum ("Given the length of the spectrum reallocation process, these reforms should reflect expectations of how the wireless world will look 10 years from now. These reforms should ensure that there is sufficient, flexible spectrum that accommodates growing demand and evolving technologies.) Id. at Exhibit 5-C: Time Historically Required to Reallocate Spectrum (where the approximate lag time was eleven years for cellular (advanced mobile phone system), six years for PCS, ten years for Educational Broadband Service (EBS)/Broadband Radio Service (BRS), thirteen years for 700 MHZ, and six years for AWS-1). (describing "factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex, including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting…"). 82 See also Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, at 51 ("Transaction costs are never zero. In fact they may be quite high even in two-party transactions, as we shall see many times in this book. Generally, however, the costs of a transaction rise with the number of parties to it -and very steeply; the formula for the number of links required to join all members of a set of n members is suggestive: n(n-1)/2."). Posner describes the exponential number of outcomes from multi-party transactions. law does not reach socially efficient outcomes, statutory regulation has dealt with massive class action lawsuits where polluters and victims are difficult to identify. 84 Trespass rules for invasions, on the other hand, rely on clear exclusion boundaries when parties are few in number and transaction costs are low. 85 The enforcement of such a broad right through injunction allows an "initial presumption" to the owner to have protection from interference in determining the use of a particular resource. 86 The common law can also mix traditional trespass and nuisance standards. In Boomer, a judge shaped an otherwise appropriate nuisance case toward a trespass outcome. 87 Judge
Posner analyzed the approach, "[T]he court held that any substantial interference with another person's enjoyment of his land is a nuisance. This is a trespasslike standard, and as there were only a few plaintiffs (and one defendant -a dust-spewing cement factory), one might have thought that the court would have granted an injunction." 88 The distinction perhaps, was the "dramatic illustration of a bilateral monopoly", where the court protected enjoyment of the land from any substantial interference.
Liability rules in tort that avoid injunctive relief and award damage payments require instead quantitative determinations of harm or infringement. When ideas are built upon others to create value, some scholars argue damages promote the discovery of productive uses for information at less significant loss of innovation than injunctive remedies. Such tailored determinations "whether… interference exists" arguably cost less to innovation, than "absolute" "front-end assurance" in favor of the status quo. can contract through roaming agreements and equity shares. 94 Vertically, efficiencies can be combined in bundles of services and products. 95 Integration can also occur in more transformative forms, one example in an overlay plan to grandfather frequency rights into new super licenses. 96 Such greenfields would lower transaction costs by decreasing the number of radio operators. 97 The residual claimant of the frequency band would consolidate a larger set of financial risks and business judgments on integration of existing and emerging radio combinations. As the final owner of the resource after income, costs, and creditor claims, the licensee would waste or produce according to its fiduciary duties to shareholders and business partners. 98 Reclassification of license terms raise antitrust concerns and media ownership considerations as well. To the extent that greater spectrum efficiency is needed in the information economy, integration gains ought to be considered. many radios saturate the airwaves, they may become substitutes over time. 99 Unlicensed spectrum operators may become more, and not less, concerned with boundaries that organize old devices from new. 100 As described above, the regulator of a governance regime will define which radio designs are complements or substitutes in multi-year administrative proceedings. 101 Spectrum efficiency is counter-intuitive in this light. Sharing more as a policy, should mean innovators seek to share less of a resource entitlement for the same outcome. Efficient use of the spectrum means greater information capacity channels, and more data on less energy with less noise. 102 Competitors vie to design and deploy better devices on the receiver and transmitter ends. Researchers transform battery life, power consumption, computing capacity, sensing capacity, modulation formats, and antenna sophistication.
While sharing implies complementarity, it ignores trade-offs required in economic decisions of rivalry. 103 The term of art avoids dynamic adjustment of what constitutes a complement or substitute, and assumes that primary and secondary users are where much human activity occurs in fixed and predictable locations. 108 Given the mass market for Wi-Fi configuration, radio standards are coming to market with consistent succession.
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Wi-Fi signals have complementary boundaries, and enforcement is decentralized to private property owners of fixed nodes, with no guarantees of interference quality.
Private owners, however, have fiduciary relationships with customers, where for example, the owner of an NFL stadium provides attendees with a limited license to attend a game and use its facilities. 110 In similar fashion, the owner of the retail coffee chain provides access, setting terms and conditions before the user accepts access to a network.
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Conclusion
The complement-substitute determination changes as consumer demand and technology supply changes. Defining complements and substitutes is an important element of the property bundle for technology platforms. A spectrum license that some may call "too much property" that does not grant the ability to determine an exclusive right of use determination, may indeed be "too little property" for platforms with evolving boundaries.
112
Radios will enter the market quickly in the next decade. The exit and reallocation of old receivers in a market-driven manner depends on default rules that promote upgrade over holdout. Asymmetric interference and design costs vary across diverse radio uses.
Whether a new receiver is a complement or substitute in its economic relationship to an old receiver defines the interference margins that can be narrowed and whether reconfiguration costs can be internalized through integration. If unaligned, information costs and transaction costs are institutionally established where property and liability remedies each have shortcomings.
This article presented organizing principles with emphasis on the costs of upgrading old receivers, and whether exclusion or governance operated in more efficient manners. The exclusive right to use determination to determine which radio uses are complements and substitutes is consistent with information platforms, while governance of shared spectrum as commons of complements is a cheap solution until the possibility of congestion. To reallocate spectrum, the policies by which old receivers are integrated and reconfigured will impact possibilities for spectrum efficiency.
